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Abstract. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) used the notion of a language game
to illustrate how language is interwoven with action. Here we consider how
successful linguistic discourse of the sort he described might emerge in the
context of a self-assembling evolutionary game. More specifically, we consider
how discourse and coordinated action might self-assemble in the context of two
generalized signaling games. The first game shows how prospective language
users might learn to initiate meaningful discourse. The second shows how more
subtle varieties of discourse might co-emerge with a meaningful language.
1. introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein was concerned with how meaningful language was inter-
woven with action. As he put it, in learning a language “children are brought up
to perform these actions, to use these words as they do so, and to react in this way
to the words of others” (1958, 6).1 Learning a language involves establishing an
association between words and actions. To illustrate how meaningful language is
interwoven with action, Wittgenstein described a simple language meant to serve
for communication between a builder A and her assistant B:
A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs
and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which
A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of
the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out;—
B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such
a call.— Conceive this as a complete primitive language. (1958, 2)
In using the language, one agent calls out the words and the other acts on them.
To know how to do so is to know the rules of a game. More generally, “[w]e can
. . . think of the whole process of using words in [the builder-assistant language]
as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language.”
The language game associated with the primitive builder-assistant language is “the
whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” (1958, 7).
Inasmuch as it involves learning how to use the language, a language game
on Wittgenstein’s conception is an evolutionary game. As the players repeatedly
interact, they update their strategies on the basis of what has happened in past
plays. They are playing the game well when their language use facilitates successful
action.
Our aim here is not to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s philosophical views generally
nor his account of how one might learn an established language more specifically.
We are concerned, rather, with how a language game, where words are inextricably
Date: August 5, 2021.
1The Wittgenstein references are to the numbered sections of his 1958 Philosophical Investigations.
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interwoven with action, might emerge from prelinguistic interactions between po-
tential language users. This forging of a language game might also be characterized
as an evolutionary game. It is a game that shows how language and action might
come to form an integrated whole in the first place. In particular, we will consider
how this might happen in the context of generalized signaling games that allow for
self-assembly.
David Lewis (1969) introduced the idea of a signaling game to show how linguistic
conventions might be established. Brian Skyrms (2006) subsequently showed how
the classical games Lewis described might be reformulated as evolutionary games
that illustrate how even low-rationality learners might evolve simple signaling lan-
guages. Barrett and Skyrms (2017) have more recently shown how both simple
and more generalized signaling games might self-assemble by means of ritualized
interactions.2
The generalized signaling games we consider here illustrate features of self-
assembly. The self-assembly allows for the structure of the players’ interactions
itself to evolve on repeated plays. These games show how (1) a meaningful lan-
guage and (2) the structure of discourse in that language might coevolve to facilitate
successful action. The first game shows how players might learn to initiate mean-
ingful discourse by asking a question rather than immediately acting. The second
game and a variant we will briefly consider show how agents may evolve to ask
new questions with coordinated meanings that coevolve on repeated plays.3 These
games explain how language and the structure of discourse itself may come to be
interwoven with action.
2. the emergence of discourse
We will start with something akin to Wittgenstein’s builder-assistant game. It
shows how agents might come to be involved in meaningful discourse using an
evolved language instead of simply acting in the first place. It also shows how they
might learn to end discourse and to act instead of talking. While this game is
very simple, it allows for self-assembly. It is this that determines the structure of
discourse between the two agents.
The question game begins with nature randomly determining whether the builder
needs a slab or a block with unbiased probabilities. The assistant knows that the
builder needs a slab or a block but does not know which. He may guess at what the
builder needs and hand her a slab S or a block B at random, or he may produce a
signal Q.4
2See also Barrett, Skyrms, and Mohseni (2018), and Barrett (2020). See Barrett, Skyrms, and
Cochran (2020) and Steinert-Threlkeld (2020) for two accounts of how nontrivial linguistic com-
positionality might evolve in the context of signaling games under reinforcement learning.
3The second game might be thought of as a more general version of a game Skyrms described
(2010, 154–5). On that game, the players are faced with different decision problems that require
different information to solve. Nature presents one player with the decision problem. That player
sends a signal to her friend who selects one of two partitions of nature to observe, then sends a
reply. The first player then chooses an action to perform based on the return signal. This game
illustrates how questions might evolve to make use of a fixed partition. In contrast, we show here
how coordinated questions, partitions, and the structure of discourse itself might coevolve.
4At least initially, a signal is just a state of nature produced by the assistant to which the builder
has epistemic access and on which she might consequently condition her actions. The various
signals we will consider are assumed to be distinguishable from each other so that the listener can
act in a way that depends on the particular signal sent.
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If the assistant decides to guess and hands the builder what she needs given the
current state of nature, then the interaction is a success. In this case, the assistant is
rewarded in a way that may influence his future actions, something we will discuss
in more detail in a moment. If the assistant hands the builder the wrong thing
given the current state of nature, then the interaction is a failure. In this case,
neither the assistant nor the builder are rewarded, and they may even be punished,
something else we will discuss in a moment. So if the assistant hands the builder a
block or slab, players succeed or fail and the current round of the game is over.
If the assistant decides instead to signal Q, then the builder observes the signal
and replies with one of two signals A0 or A1.
5 In this case, the assistant has a second
chance to guess what the builder needs by handing her a slab S or a block B, or
he may again signal Q. If the assistant chooses to hand something and hands the
builder what she needs given the current state of nature, then the interaction is a
success and both players are rewarded. If the assistant hands the builder the wrong
thing, then the interaction is a failure. In this case, neither player is rewarded
and both may be punished. If the assistant chooses to signal Q again, then the
interaction is a failure and both players may be punished.
Note that the question game may be played without any discourse at all if the
assistant always chooses just to guess what the builder needs. In that case, one
should expect the builder and her assistant to be successful about half the time as
a result of blind luck. For the builder and her assistant to do better than chance,
they must coevolve an integrated set of dispositions. Specifically, the assistant
must learn to initiate discourse with Q, the builder must learn to use A0 and A1 to
represent the current state of nature, and the assistant must learn to respond by
handing the builder the building material that has come to be represented by the
builder’s signal. If the builder and her assistant evolve to be uniformly successful, Q
must come to initiate discourse much as the question “What do you need?” might,
and A0 and A1 must come to specify each of the two building materials slab and
block.
In order to characterize an evolutionary game, we need to say how the players
learn from their experience. To this end, we will consider two learning dynamics:
simple reinforcement learning and reinforcement with punishment.6 One might
represent how the players’ dispositions evolve under each of these dynamics by
considering a process of adding and drawing balls from urns. The urns and the types
of ball each contains represent the degrees of freedom of the players’ dispositions and
the proportion of each type of ball in each urn represent their first-order dispositions
5We are concerned here with how the assistant might learn to initiate discourse. Importantly, a
similar story might be told for how the builder might learn to continue discourse by replying to
Q. In each case, the process is one where the structure of the players’ interactions self-assembles
through the ritualization of successful actions. How this might work for various aspects of the
structure of a language game is a recurring theme in the present paper. See Barrett and Skyrms
(2017) and Barrett (2020) for discussions of how self-assembly works more generally.
6See Herrnstein (1970), Roth and Erev (1995), and Erev and Roth (1998) for a description of
various forms of reinforcement learning and how they maybe used to characterize human learning
in a number of salient contexts. See Barrett (2006) for an early investigation of a number of
learning dynamics and Barrett and Zollman (2009) for a discussion of the role of punishment and
forgetting in learning. See Alexander, Skyrms, and Zabell (2012), Barrett, Cochran, Huttegger,
and Fujiwara (2017), Cochran and Barrett (2020) and (2021), and Barrett and Gabriel (2021) for
discussions of increasingly subtle learning strategies.
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Figure 1. A question game. Play begins in the top left and
zig-zags towards the bottom right. The far right column of text
represents nature’s play, while the middle column represents sig-
nals and/or actions taken by players. The boxes represent urns
which the respective players draw from, conditioned on nature’s
play and/or the signals received.
to act on states of nature and signals. Some of their actions will serve to structure
their discourse.
The question game on simple reinforcement learning proceeds as indicated in
Figure 1 read from top to bottom. The events on each round of play are as follows.
question game (simple reinforcement):
assistant move i: Nature randomly determines whether the builder needs a slab
or a block with unbiased probabilities. The assistant draws a ball from his start
urn. This urn begins with one ball each of types Q, S, and B. If he draws S or
B he just hands the builder a slab or a block. If the builder gets what she needs
given the state of nature, then the assistant returns the ball he drew to the urn from
which he drew it and adds a duplicate ball of the same type. Else, the assistant just
returns the ball he drew to the urn from which it was drawn. But if the assistant
draws Q, he signals Q.
builder move i: If the assistant signals Q, the builder in turn draws a ball from
an urn corresponding to the building material she needs. Specifically, if nature tells
her that she needs a slab, then she draws from her slab urn; and if nature tells
her that she needs a block, then she draws from her block urn. Each of these urns
initially contains one ball each of types A0 and A1. If the builder draws an A0 ball,
she signals A0; and if she draws an A1 ball, she signals A1.
assistant move ii: When the assistant hears the builder’s reply, he draws from
one of two reply urns, A0 and A1, each initially containing one ball each of types Q,
S, and B, then either signals Q again, or hands a slab S or block B to the builder.
If the builder gets the building material she needs, then the round was successful
and both players return the balls they drew to the urns from which they drew them
and add a duplicate ball. Else, each agent just returns his or her balls to the urns
from which they were drawn.
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Figure 2. Final accuracies for the question game, displayed as
an empirical CDF. Individual dots indicate the results of actual
simulations, rank-ordered such that the corresponding value on the
ordinate indicates the number of simulations out of 1000 which
had less than or equal to the specified final accuracy. The blue
distribution indicates the results for simple (+1,−0) reinforcement,
while the orange distribution the results for reinforcement with
punishment (+1,−1).
A closely analogous description characterizes the question game under reinforce-
ment with punishment. The difference is that here when a round leads to a suc-
cessful action, each of the players returns the ball that he or she drew to the urn
from which it was drawn and adds a copy of that ball. And when a round leads to
failure, each of the players discards the ball that he or she drew unless it was the
last ball of its type in the urn; in which case, he or she just returns the drawn ball
to the urn from which it was drawn.
On simulation, the builder and her assistant begin by acting randomly, but
on repeated plays, the assistant typically evolves to ask what the builder needs
rather than just guess, and the builder’s reply coevolves to represent what she
needs. With 107 plays per run, on simple reinforcement, the players end up with
dispositions that are reliable more than 0.9 of the time on 0.895 of the runs. For
(+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment, all of the runs were observed to yield a
final reliability better than 0.9.
Figure 2 provides a more more detailed sense of these results. The blue distribu-
tion represents the number of simulation runs out of 1000 where the final accuracy
was less than or equal to the specified value on simple reinforcement learning. The
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dots indicate the actual final accuracy of each run. The orange distribution does
the same for (+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment.7
Inasmuch as Q, A0, and A1 are initially meaningless, they are neither questions
nor answers. But as the players interact with each other and the world and update
their dispositions in accord with their learning dynamics, Q comes to serve as
a question and A0 and A1 come to serve as answers, answers that communicate
precisely what the assistant needs to know to hand the right thing to the builder
given the current state of nature.
To be successful, the assistant must learn to initiate discourse and the builder and
the assistant must together forge a language with sufficient expressive resources to
tell the assistant what the builder needs. This requires them to coevolve dispositions
that bind their signals and actions in such a way as to form an integrated whole that
both structures their discourse and gives it content. Just as with Wittgenstein’s
language game, the game that self-assembles here allows for basic communication
between the builder and her assistant.
Here the structure of the language game they ultimately produce coevolves with
the meanings of the players’ signals.8 The options each player has on a round of
play and the significance of those options depend on what the players did in earlier
rounds, what happened when they did it, and how they updated their dispositions.
The self-assembling game evolves a language game with a fixed structure together
with the players’ strategies for playing that game.
Important for the present line of argument, the agents cannot even begin to
evolve a language with sufficient expressive resources for the task at hand without
first getting involved in discourse. Self-assembly explains how the language part
of the language game comes to be played at all. In brief, the agents start talking
because because discourse eventually has salutary consequences. If they do not
begin to play the language part of the game, they have no chance of evolving the
stable linguistic practice that ultimately allows them to coordinate their practical
actions. When they do start talking, it does not take long to get some measure of
success. And this leads to further talk.9
Also concerning the structure of discourse, the agents are only successful in the
present game if the assistant learns when it is appropriate to stop asking questions
and to act on the information shared by the builder. Knowing how to stop talking
is as important as knowing how to start. But ending the conversation is only
successful if the assistant gives the builder the right thing. It is in this way that the
very structure of discourse co-emerges with meaningful language. Together they
allow for successful action.
7There are 1000 runs on each game. The final accuracy is determined by running each game 103
additional non-learning plays after the initial 107 and tracking how well the players do just in this
last 103 plays. There is nothing special about this cutoff other than that it represents an accuracy
higher than any observed suboptimal pooling equilibrium.
8A classical game or standard evolutionary game has a fixed interaction structure. A self-
assembling game allows for both the structure and payoffs to evolve on repeated plays. Such
structural evolution sometimes forges a classical game.
9In the present game, there are no barriers to such exploration since asking the first question and
replying to it are both cost-free. A natural extension of this game would allow for costly signaling.
What happens in that case would depend both on the level of the costs and on precisely how they
were incurred. We will return to this issue briefly in the context of the dialogue game in the next
section.
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Figure 3. A dialogue game.
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3. meaning and the structure of discourse
In the question game, the assistant’s one linguistic act evolves to serve as a
prompt to get the builder to say something that might come to represent the mate-
rial the builder needs. One can easily imagine a self-assembling dialogue game that
allows for the evolution of more subtle language games.
Suppose that the builder needs one of four possible building materials on each
round (red slab RS, red block RB, blue slab BS, or blue block BB) and that the
assistant has two potential linguistic acts (Q0 and Q1) that may come to represent
the same or different questions. There are a number of ways to fill in the details
to characterize a particular self-assembling game. We will discuss one of these in
some detail, then briefly describe what happens in a natural variant.
Part of filling in the details involves saying what options and resources each
player has and what might affect each player’s actions at each step in the game.
To begin, we will suppose that the builder has the same four responses available
to answer each of her assistant’s two potential questions (A0, A1, A2, and A3)
and that she conditions her actions on what she needs and the question that her
assistant just asked and on nothing else. We will further suppose that the assistant
conditions his actions on everything the builder has said so far in the round and on
nothing else.10
The dialogue game on simple reinforcement proceeds as indicated in Figure 3
read from top to bottom. The events on each round of play are as follows.
dialogue game (simple reinforcement):
assistant’s move i: Nature randomly determines what the builder needs with
unbiased probabilities from among the four possible materials: red slab RS, red
block RB, blue slab BS, or blue block BB. Her assistant then draws a ball from
an urn that begins with one ball of each of the six types RS, RB, BS, BB, Q0, and
Q1. If he draws RS, RB, BS, or BB, he simply hands the corresponding material
to the builder. If it is what the builder needs, the round ends with success and the
assistant returns his ball to the urn and adds a duplicate ball of the same type.
If it is not what the builder needs, the play ends in failure and the assistant just
returns the ball he drew to the urn. If the assistant draws Q0 or Q1, he sends the
corresponding signal.
builder’s move i: The builder draws from an urn corresponding to her assistant’s
signal and the building material she needs. She has eight urns for this purpose
labeled Q0RS,Q1RS,Q0RB, . . . each initially containing one ball each of four types
A0, A1, A2, and A3. The builder sends the signal corresponding to the type of ball
drawn.
assistant’s move ii: The assistant observes the builder’s reply and draws a ball
from one of four new urns A0, A1, A2, and A3, each corresponding to one of the
possible replies. Each reply urn begins with one ball of each of the six types RS, RB,
BS, BB, Q0, and Q1. If he draws RS, RB, BS, or BB, he hands the corresponding
material to the builder. If the assistant gives the builder what she needs, the round
10One might consider games where the players condition on anything to which they have epistemic
access. What they in fact find salient evolves by means of a learning dynamics that serves to
ritualize whatever behavior leads to successful action. See Barrett and Skyrms (2017) and Barrett
(2020) for details regarding how this works.
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ends with success and both players return the balls they have drawn to the urns
from which they were drawn and add a duplicate ball of the same type. If it is not
what is needed, the round ends in failure and each just returns the ball(s) to the
urns from which they were drawn. Else, if the assistant draws Q0 or Q1, he sends
the corresponding signal.
builder’s move ii: This is exactly the same as builder move (i). The builder has
only one set of urns, so the dispositions that the builder uses to reply to the first
question are precisely the same as the dispositions she uses to reply to the second
question.
assistant’s move iii: The assistant observes the builder’s second reply and draws
from one of sixteen new urns depending on both the builder’s first and second replies
labeled A0A0, A0A1, . . .. Each of these reply urns begins with one ball of each of
the six types RS, RB, BS, BB, Q0, and Q1. If he draws RS, RB, BS, or BB, he
gives the corresponding material to the builder, and the round ends in success or
failure depending on whether the builder got what she needs. The players reinforce
on all draws that led to success in the round and do not reinforce on failure. If the
assistant draws Q0 or Q1, he asks another question and the round ends in failure
as the builder has lost patience. The players do not reinforce.
Again, an analogous description characterizes the dialogue game under (+1,−1)
reinforcement with punishment. Success works just as described above, but failure
leads to each ball drawn in the round being discarded unless it was the last ball of
its type in the urn from which it was drawn.
In order to be optimally successful, the builder and assistant must learn to com-
municate within an evolved structure of interactions using questions and answers
that have coevolved coordinated meanings. The assistant must learn to initiate
discourse, to ask the right questions given their evolving meanings, and eventually
to stop asking questions. And the builder must evolve answers to the two questions
the assistant may ask that together communicate what she needs.
Note that only the first question and answer are in principle needed in the
present game. That said, asking both questions may still serve a purpose if the first
question does not end up eliciting a response that fully specifies what the builder
needs. If the agents do evolve to play beyond the first question on a round, the
two questions might come to mean different things that together determine the
assistant to provide the builder with the material she needs. Indeed, this often
happens under simple reinforcement learning.
On simulation, the players initially act and signal randomly, but on repeated
plays, they again typically evolve nearly optimal dispositions. With 107 plays per
run on simple reinforcement, they end up with actions that are reliable more than
0.9 of the time on 0.890 of the runs. On (+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment,
all of the runs were observed to yield a nearly optimal final reliability. The blue
distribution in Figure 4 represents the number of simulation runs out of 1000 that
did less than or equal to the specified final accuracy value on simple reinforcement.
The orange does the same for (+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment. A signifi-
cant proportion of the runs on simple reinforcement 0.072 exhibited a final success
rate of less than 0.8. These suboptimal pooling equilibria can be seen in the blue
distribution’s inflection point at 0.75 in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Final accuracies for the dialogue game.
The agents are so successful in evolving an efficient language game on the
(+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment self-assembling game, that there is not
much to say. In contrast, quite different language games may evolve on the simple
reinforcement self-assembling game.
On different runs of the simple reinforcement game, the players sometimes evolve
language practice that does not require a second question. The assistant needs two
bits of information to know what material the builder needs. As Figure 5 shows,
the probability of the second question being asked at all in the language game
resulting from a full run decreases as the evolved information content of the first
answer increases.
Note, however, that sometimes both questions get asked even when the first
answer is fully informative. Indeed, the second question sometimes evolves to mean
precisely the same thing as the first, as indicated by the answers it elicits and the
subsequent actions it produces. There are a number of ways that this may happen.
If the meaning of the first question were slower to evolve on a run than that of the
second, such redundancy may have played a role in early success on the run. Since
asking a second question is cost free in the present game, the evolution of this sort
of redundancy is unsurprising. One would expect it to occur less frequently if there
were a cost to asking a second question. In this spirit, there is a very high cost to
asking a third question in the present game, and it comes to be almost never asked
on either of the two dynamics.
Perhaps more interesting, the two questions sometimes evolve different mean-
ings and only allow for optimal success by dint of the systematically interrelated
meanings of the questions and the replies they elicit. Two examples of this can be
seen in Figure 6. Both of these are from runs that produced language games that
allow for nearly optimal success.
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Figure 5. The probability that the assistant asks a second ques-
tion given the information (in bits) communicated by the first ques-
tion. Once again, individual dots indicate actual simulations, with
the blue dots corresponding to those simulations with final accura-
cies greater than 0.9, the orange dots to those with final accuracies
between 0.9 and 0.75, and the green dots to those with final accu-
racies less than 0.75.
Figure 6. Two examples of evolved languages (left and right) in
which each question elicits insufficient information but together
precisely specifies the material needed.
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In the first run (left), the builder uses A0 for both RS and RB in reply to Q0,
and she uses A1 for both RS and BB in reply to Q1, but her two answers together
serve to determine the required building material.11 In the second run (right), the
builder sometimes uses A0 and sometimes uses A3 for RS and uses A2 for both RB
and BB in reply to Q0, and she uses A3 for both RS and BB and does not use
A0 at all in reply to Q1, but again her two answers together serve to determine the
required building material.12
The two questions here provide two chances for the agents to evolve a reliable
system of communication on simple reinforcement. Sometimes one works and other
is not needed. And sometimes they both work and one sees a form of redundancy.
This is akin to what provides success on a learning dynamics like reinforcement
with invention.13 But here there is also another phenomenon at work. The agents
sometime evolve to ask different, but coordinated, questions.
While two questions are both essential to the agents’ ultimate success on some
runs of the present game, one is enough in principle. But asking two questions is
always required for success in a slightly modified version of the game.
Consider a game like the one we just discussed but where the builder only has the
expressive resources for two possible answers A0 and A1 to each of the assistant’s
potential questions. On simulation, the agents sometimes evolve optimal linguistic
practice on both learning dynamics in this game as well. Here the only way that the
builder can fully specify which of the four materials she needs is if her assistant asks
both questions and if the answers to the two questions come to be systematically
interrelated. On successful runs, the assistant learns to ask precisely two questions
and the builder’s reply to each questions comes to pick out one of two coevolved
cross-cutting kinds such that the two answers together serve to specify the precise
building material needed.14
In both the original and the modified dialogue games, the meanings of the assis-
tant’s questions and the builder’s replies coevolve with the assistant’s learning to
ask questions then stop asking when he has enough information to act successfully.
The players self-assemble the structure of discourse and action that is needed for
success given the evolving meanings of the terms. And they tune the meanings of
their terms to the evolving structure of the game that they are playing. In this way,
the resulting language game comes to exhibit a systematically interrelated whole
that ties together the evolved meanings of their words and the structure of their
discourse and actions.
11If she needs RS, she answers A0 to Q0 and A1 to Q1. If she needs BB, she answers A1 to Q0
and A1 to Q1. And for RB and BS she answers both questions A0 and A3 respectively.
12If she needs RS, she answers A0 or A1 to Q0 and A3 to Q1. If she needs BB, she answers A2
to Q0 and A3 to Q1. And for BS and RB she answers both questions A1 and A2 respectively.
13On this dynamics, new terms are invented during play. Since each new term has a chance
of evolving a reliable meaning under simple reinforcement, each increases the chance that the
signaling game will be successful. But they dynamics also produces a lot of redundancy in the
form of evolved synonyms. See Alexander, Skyrms, and Zabell (2012).
14This is similar to the natural-kind games described in Barrett (2007a) (2007b) except, most
saliently, here the game self-assembles to involve two questions as the meanings of the answers co-
evolve to represent conventional kinds. This modified dialogue game is significantly more difficult
than Barrett’s natural-kind games or the dialogue game just discussed. On simple reinforcement,
only 0.162 of the simulations have final accuracies greater than 0.75, with 0.078 having final ac-
curacies greater than 0.9. On (+1,−1) reinforcement with punishment, 0.548 of the simulations
reached final accuracies greater than 0.9.
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4. discussion
Wittgenstein used the notion of a language game to illustrate how language is
interwoven with action. We have shown here how a systematically interrelated
whole where the agents’ words and the structure of their discourse and actions are
thoroughly integrated to facilitate successful cooperative action might be forged in
the context of a simple learning dynamics. This explains how a simple language
game like that described by Wittgenstein might come to be.
Self-assembly is essential to the agents’ success in each of the games we have
considered. The agents cannot even begin to evolve a language without first getting
involved in discourse. And they cannot benefit from having evolved a language that
allows for reliable communication without learning when to stop talking and use
what they have learned.
Importantly, the games here illustrate only a part of the full self-assembly pro-
cess. Just as the assistant learns to ask and to stop asking questions in the present
games, the builder may learn to reply to the assistant’s questions rather than to
remain silent. To investigate how such a feature of discourse might evolve, one
would give the builder the option of not replying at all or replying with one of a
set of responses and see what happens under the learning dynamics. And so on for
other aspects of the agents’ evolving structure of interactions.
What ultimately drives the evolution of discourse is the ritualization of successful
action under the learning dynamics of the self-assembling game. It is this that
structures the interactions of the agents and determines the significance of their
actions at every step of their coevolved linguistic practice. It is this that explains
how the agents might come to play a lauguage game at all.
The self-assembly of increasingly subtle language games allows for richer forms
of meaningful discourse. In each evolved game, one’s language and actions are
inextricably interwoven.
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